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Intellectual Property Aspects of Robotics 
Enrico Bonadio, Luke McDonagh and Christopher Arvidsson * 
 
I. THE ROBOTICS INDUSTRY AND ITS INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM 
 
The field of robotics is remarkably wide, with many social settings now entailing and increasingly 
requiring the use of robots to support a variety of human activities. Unsurprisingly, robots’ form and 
shape, their level of intelligence and intended purpose can vary significantly depending on the relevant 
industry.1 Domestic robots are already a reality in a growing number of family homes. They include 
both humanoid robots which support those in need (such as the elderly, people with disabilities or 
children) and robots for household consumer markets, including domestic vacuum cleaners and grass-
trimmers. Humanoid robots only account for a small fraction of the industry with robotic arms for 
industrial automation being instead widespread.2 
According to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International 
Federation of Robotics (IFR), a robot is an actuated mechanism programmable in two or more axes 
with a degree of autonomy, moving within its environment, to perform intended tasks.3 The ISO and 
IFR further distinguish between industrial and service robots.4 While robots in the former category 
handle tasks such as packaging, assembling and palletizing,5 professional service robots on the other 
hand include logistic systems, defence robots and medical robots.6 As mentioned above, there are also 
personal and domestic service robots which are used for domestic tasks as well as entertainment and 
leisure purposes.7  
Furthermore, innovation in artificial intelligence (AI),8 processing power and sensors have all 
helped to enhance the field of robotics9 and increased the type of tasks that robots can perform.10 As 
                                                
* Dr. Enrico Bonadio and Dr Luke McDonagh are Senior Lecturers in intellectual property law at The City Law School, City, University of 
London. They are both part of a group of researchers that have been awarded funding by the EU as part of Horizon2020 to assess the area of 
1  See discussion by H. James Wilson, What Is a Robot, Anyway? (2015) Harvard Business Review, available at: 
https://hbr.org/2015/04/what-is-a-robot-anyway. 
2 C. Andrew Keisner, Julio Raffo, Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Economic Research Working Paper No. 30, Breakthrough technologies –
 Robotics, innovation and intellectual property, WIPO Publication, at p.4. 
3 See ISO 8373:2012(en) Robots and robotic devices — Vocabulary, available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8373:ed-2:v1:en. 
ISO is an international organisation with a membership of 161 national standards bodies. Through its members, ISO develops voluntary 
International Standards which aims to support innovation and provide solutions to global challenges (https://www.iso.org/about-us.html). 
ISO 8373 is an International Standard that specifies vocabulary used in relation to inter alia robots operating in industrial and non-industrial 
environments. As such, ISO 8373 provides definitions and explanations of the most commonly used terms that are grouped into clauses by 
main topics of robotics. See also IFR, Service Robots - Definition and Classification WR 2016, available 
https://ifr.org/img/office/Service_Robots_2016_Chapter_1_2.pdf. The IFR was established as a non-profit organisation in 1987 and consists 
of members from the robotics industry, national or international industry associations and research & development institutes. Amongst other 
things, the organisation provides market data, stimulates research in robotics and promotes links between science and industry 
(https://ifr.org/association).  
4  See ISO webpages at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:8373:ed-2:v1:en; IFR (Service Robots), 
https://ifr.org/img/office/Service_Robots_2016_Chapter_1_2.pdf; IFR (Industrial Robots), 
https://ifr.org/img/office/Industrial_Robots_2016_Chapter_1_2.pdf. 
5 See IFR webpages at https://ifr.org/img/office/Industrial_Robots_2016_Chapter_1_2.pdf. 
6 See Executive Summary at https://ifr.org/downloads/press/Executive_Summary_WR_Service_Robots_2017_1.pdf, p.12.  
7 Ibid., p.14. 
8 Although exploring a comprehensive definition of AI is beyond the scope of this article, it is thought of as an area of technology that 
focuses on the creation of intelligent machines that work and react like human beings. Examples of technologies that can currently be termed 
AI include spam filters, algorithmic trading systems and medical systems generating diagnoses (see 
https://ifr.org/downloads/papers/Media_Backgrounder_on_Artificial_Intelligence_in_Robotics_May_2018.pdf, p.1). 
9 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.7. 
10  See IFR  Artificial Intelligence in Robotics, May 2018 at 
https://ifr.org/downloads/papers/Media_Backgrounder_on_Artificial_Intelligence_in_Robotics_May_2018.pdf, p.1 
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explained by the IFR, “the output of an artificial intelligence algorithm can be used as the input to 
another programme or physical machine ... such as a robot.”11 Robotics companies can use AI to make 
their final products more functional, and future improvements and incorporation of AI into robots will 
make them more interactive, accepted and appreciated. The European Parliament has even expressed 
that “ … there is a possibility that in the long-term, AI could surpass human intellectual capacity ... ”12 
According to Keisner, Raffo and Wunsch-Vincent, there are certain core features which 
characterise the ‘robotics innovation ecosystem’.13 First, robotics R&D and innovation are highly 
concentrated in a handful of countries, such as the US, EU (especially Germany) and Japan. Available 
patent data also reflects this geographical concentration, with applicants from the above countries 
accounting for the vast majority of patent applications in the field. Second, the ecosystem consists of a 
network of different actors, eg individuals, universities and research institutions (with their spin-out 
companies) as well as technology-intensive firms, all collaborating to drive innovation forward. Third, 
government funding is often key to supporting robotics R&D. 
In terms of structure, this article consists of two parts. The first part deals with intellectual 
property (IP) strategies that can be pursued by robotics companies. It also mentions legal disputes 
concerning alleged infringements of robot-related IP rights. The second part then expands on the 
thorny issues of whether AI-embedded robots and machines can create works that could be protected 
by copyright and come up with inventions that could be patentable; and, if so, who should be 
considered as author or inventor, and thus owner of the copyright or patent. The focus will be on the 
European landscape. Yet, as robotic related IP litigations have predominantly occurred in the US and 
many scholarly papers on this subject have been penned by US scholars and commentators, references 
will also be made to the American scenario. 
 
II. ROBOTICS AND IP  
IP protection is vital in all R&D intensive industries, and the field of robotics is no exception. 
Robotics firms often undertake years of intensive (and expensive) research before being in a position 
to sell their products and reach commercial success.14 The lengthy and costly process of delivering 
profitable products highlights the role of IP rights which are viewed as necessary to recoup up-front 
investments and to fend off competitors seeking to capitalise on the R&D investments of their rivals. 
Any company subject to due diligence because of, for instance, a strategic investment plan, acquisition 
or IPO, will likely have its IP portfolio reviewed as part of this process, with potential investors likely 
to view robotics firms without a strong IP portfolio as a less attractive investment option.15 Investors 
will not only want to see the potential for promising robotic applications but also the protection via IP 
                                                
11 Ibid., p.1. 
12 See the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics 
(2015/2103(INL)), letter P.  
13 See the discussion in Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.12. 
14 See for example C. Andrew Keisner, Consultant, Julio Raffo and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Breakthrough Technologies – Robotics and IP, 
December 2016, Economics and Statistics Division, WIPO 2016, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2016/06/article_0002.html.  
15 See the article “Making Your Robotics Company a More Attractive Investment”, in Robotic Business Review of  21 October 2012, at 
https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/unmanned/making_your_robotics_company_a_more_attractive_investment. 
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rights so that their company can achieve and defend success.16 As has been suggested, those within the 
“…robotics industry are marathon runners, not sprinters … ”, meaning that if a business is getting 
closer to the finish line, it (and its investors) will not want competitors who did not “... run the first 
twenty five miles of the race to jump in and compete ... on that last mile.”17 
We will now look at how the acquisition and management of IP rights – i.e. patents, trade secrets, 
copyright, trade marks and designs – may benefit robotics companies, especially in Europe. We will 
also highlight a number of court disputes where robotics companies have sought to enforce such rights 
against alleged infringers, with several of these cases having been settled out-of-court (most IP 
litigation involving robotics firms has occurred in the US, though). 
 
1. Patents 
R&D within the robotics industry often takes place for several years before resulting in a viable 
commercial opportunity, with patents being the main legal instrument to recoup investments. Patents 
protect inventions and give their owners a right to prevent others from exploiting the patented 
technology. In other words, they are legal monopolies which give innovators a tool to maximise 
profits from the developed technology. Both large and small companies can rely on patents to attract 
investors as well as protect their investments in technology. For example, smaller and more 
specialised firms often use patents to protect their IP assets defensively against larger players.18 
  Robotics companies active within the European market often apply for a European Patent, 
which is a bundle of national patents granted by the European Patent Office.19 This route can prove 
useful when robotics firms aim at protecting their inventions in several European countries. It is a 
matter of strategy, with companies deciding their filing plans depending on whether a national market 
is of particular interest and where infringements by direct or indirect competitors are likely to occur.20  
The patent route can be particularly valuable for companies whose robots, or their elements, 
can be easily reverse-engineered (reverse-engineering is the process whereby a product can be 
deconstructed to disclose its elements and the way it is manufactured). Indeed, in situations where 
reverse-engineering is straightforward, filing for a patent may be favoured over the alternative tactic - 
trying to protect the process of manufacturing and/or the relevant product by keeping them secret - 
with that patent being enforceable against any third party that exploits the invention without the 
patentee’s consent. Symmetrically, relying on trade secrets to protect robotics inventions can work 
well where: (i) robots are produced and used in a controlled environment; (ii) reverse-engineering is 
not easy to carry out; and (iii) those working with the products are committed to secrecy.21 
Furthermore, trade secret protection may potentially last much longer than that offered by patents (20 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.27. 
19 The European Patent Office is based in Munich (Germany), its activity, and the patents it grants, being regulated by the European Patent 
Convention (Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention: “EPC”) of 5 October 1973 as revised by the Act 
revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000). 
20 Linda J. Thayer; Rachel L. Emsley, Be Competitive: Patent Planning for Robotics Companies (2011) Robot Magazine, available at 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/be-competitive-patent-planning-for-robotics-companies.html. 
21  See the webpages of Finnegan law firm at 
https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/8/6/v3/866/IntellectualPropertyConsiderationsfortheRoboticsIndustry-revised.pdf. 
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years from the filing date), as industrial secrets that meet the relevant requirements are protected for as 
long as they remain confidential (potentially for an indefinite period). Thus, the decision to apply for a 
patent may be influenced by the complexity of the company’s products and whether the company’s 
competitors are likely to get their hands on such products and subsequently reverse-engineer them. For 
example, are the robots likely to reach millions of private homes or will they merely be deployed 
behind closed factory doors? These are factors that need to be considered when it comes to protecting 
robotics innovation through IP. 
Some notable patent-related disputes have involved robotics companies, especially in the US, 
with the firm iRobot having been particularly active in the courtroom. A dispute is the 2005 lawsuit 
against Urus Industrial Corporation before the court of Massachusetts.22 iRobot claimed that Urus’ 
vacuum cleaner “Koolvac” infringed the patents covering its famous “Roomba”, sought a permanent 
injunction and asked for damages. 23  The parties eventually reached a settlement whereby the 
defendant agreed not to sell its Koolvac robotic vacuum cleaner in the US after a set period of time 
during which the defendant was entitled to dispose of its current inventory.24 The final consent 
judgment confirmed that iRobot’s patents – namely U.S. Patent No. 6,594,844, Patent No. 6,809.490 
and Patent No. 6,883,201 – were all valid and enforceable.25 In 2007 iRobot filed another patent 
infringement suit in the US District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against Robotic FX 
Inc., alleging inter alia that the latter had exploited iRobot’s patented technology covering its 
“PackBot” robot.26  PackBot was the first military robot used by the US Army and aimed at 
recognising and clearing roadside bombs. Subsequently, iRobot and the defendant entered into a 
settlement agreement recorded in a consent judgment.27 The agreement confirmed that the parties 
agreed that iRobot is the owner of all rights, title and interest in and to the patents in question, which 
Robotic FX infringed by producing and selling its Negotiator robot.28 
iRobot has also enforced its patents in Europe. In 2013 it filed a lawsuit before the Court of 
Dusseldorf (Germany) against several companies including Solac GmbH, asserting that the Solac 
Ecogenic AA3400 vacuum robot had infringed five of its European patents. The case was 
subsequently settled. In 2013 iRobot brought another legal action, this time against the Chinese 
company Shenzhen Silver Star Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd., again before the Court of Dusseldorf. 
It obtained four preliminary injunctions, based on the German portions of four European patents,29 
preventing the sale by the defendant of vacuum cleaner robots of the types XR210, M-H688 and M-
788 in Germany.30  
 
                                                
22 iRobot Corporation v Urus Industrial Corporation Case 1:05-cv-10914-RGS. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. (Final Consent Judgment); see also iRobot’s announcement of the settlement at http://investor.irobot.com/news-releases/news-
release-details/irobot-settles-patent-and-copyright-infringement-lawsuit. 
25 Ibid. (Final Consent Judgment). 
26 iRobot Corporation v Robotic FX, INC, Civil Action No. CV-07-RRA-1511-S. 
27 iRobot Corporation v Robotic FX INC, C.A. No. 2:07-cv-1511-RRA (Stipulated Consent Judgement and Permanent Injunction). 
28 Ibid.   
29 The patents in question are EP 1 331 537 B1, EP 2 251 757 B1, EP 1 969 438 B1, and EP 1 395 888 B1. 
30  See iRobot’s press release at http://investor.irobot.com/news-releases/news-release-details/irobots-preliminary-injunctions-against-
shenzhen-silver-star. 
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2. Trade Secrets 
As mentioned, robotics firms may rely on trade secrets and the legal protection given to such 
information, to protect their investments in technology. Trade secrets are protected in most countries 
of the world, although the type and degree of protection varies. In the EU, Directive 2016/943 was 
approved in June 2016 with the aim of harmonising the laws that protect undisclosed know-how and 
business information against unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure.31 
As observed by Keisner, Raffo and Wunsch-Vincent, “[t]here are multiple reasons why a 
robotics company may prefer to keep certain technologies ... as trade secrets rather than seeking patent 
protection.”32 First, trade secrets confer protection without the need to adhere to certain prescribed 
formalities, such as filing an application with an office. Robotics companies can therefore avoid 
certain costs and complexities associated with patent filing and prosecution. This may be particularly 
useful in Europe where, due to fragmentation, obtaining and enforcing patents is more expensive than 
in other jurisdictions such as US and Japan. For example, the European Patent Office requires the 
payment of several fees to get European patents, including filing fees, search fees, fees per Designated 
States, fees per claim over ten claims, examination fees and finally fees for granting/printing (it has 
been estimated that obtaining a European Patent in all the EU Member States would cost applicants 
roughly €32,000, of which €23,000 would be incurred for translation fees).33 The costs of enforcing 
European patents may also skyrocket as patentees that seek to take action over infringements in 
various countries must file multiple legal actions before the national courts of those jurisdictions This 
is not only expensive, but also brings legal uncertainty as courts in different countries sometimes reach 
divergent decisions regarding the alleged infringement and the validity of the national portion of the 
European patent.34 
Second, trade secrets (rather obviously) do not require disclosure, as the patent system does. A 
patent (and the monopoly coming with it) is granted in return for the disclosure of technical 
information so that the public at large, including patentees’ competitors, will be able to exploit the 
invention after the 20-years term of protection expires. Therefore, as mentioned above, for robotics 
inventions that are more difficult to reverse-engineer, the trade secrets option may prove a superior 
alternative as the protection could potentially last indefinitely.35 Indeed, patenting robots does not 
always produce benefits. It has been noted, for instance, that in the 1980s several companies in this 
field obtained numerous patents that ended up expiring before the owners could commercialise the 
protected products.36 As has also been stressed, “trade secrets can be critical to [robotics] inventions 
that may not gain market acceptance and momentum for a long time.”37 
                                                
31 The aim of this piece of legislation is to harmonise national regimes on the protection of confidential information. 
32 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p. 27. 
33 Enrico Bonadio, The EU Embraces Enhanced Cooperation in Patent Matters: Towards a Unitary Patent Protection System (2011) 
European Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 3, p. 416. 
34 Luke McDonagh, European Patent Litigation in the Shadow of the Unified Patent Court (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
35  See discussion at the website of the Finnegan law firm 
https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/8/6/v3/866/IntellectualPropertyConsiderationsfortheRoboticsIndustry-revised.pdf, p.3 
36 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p. 32. 
37  See discussion at the website of the Finnegan law firm at 
https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/8/6/v3/866/IntellectualPropertyConsiderationsfortheRoboticsIndustry-revised.pdf at p.3 
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Third, trade secrets can protect subject matter that patents may not,38 for example innovation 
related to software and computer code. This option would be particularly beneficial also in light of the 
fact that protecting software inventions via patents has proven to be contentious (and complicated) at 
national and international levels. Take for example the 2014 US Supreme Court decision in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International,39 which found that certain claims about a computer-implemented, 
electronic escrow service for facilitating financial transactions were merely abstract ideas that cannot 
be patented.40 
 
3. Copyright 
Certain elements of robotics devices, especially software code, could be protected by copyright if they 
satisfy the relevant requirements, including originality (copyright is the main legal tool for protecting 
software, and the EU has harmonised such protection since 1991).41 This is an important option in 
light of the fact that – as we have just discussed - availability of patents for computer programs has 
proven contentious.42 Software is crucial in this field, with robots being unable to function without 
underlying code – robots deprived of software would basically be unable to perform their intended 
tasks. While typical tasks performed by robot include path-finding, control, locating and sharing data, 
some programming code also aims to imbue robots with the ability to create artistic, literary and 
musical works (as we will discuss in more detail in the second part of the article). Relying on 
copyright to protect such software is therefore key for the robotics industry.43 
Firms in this field may also rely on “technological protection measures” to restrict access to, and 
prevent copying of, a robot’s copyright-protected code.44 More precisely, what these companies may 
be interested in is to attempt to make it difficult for third parties, both competitors and users, to get 
their hands on relevant software code, by inserting electronic barriers to prevent access. Copyright 
laws allow this construction of barriers. Moreover, circumventing electronic barriers to gain access to 
copyrightable computer code is considered a violation of copyright. Take for example the EU 
Directive 2001/29 on “Copyright in the Information Society”, which provides that adequate legal 
protection must be given “against the circumvention of any effective technological measures, which 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
40 A couple of reported disputes focusing on alleged misappropriation of robot-related industrial secrets have occurred in the US. We have 
already mentioned iRobot’s lawsuit against Robotic FX Inc in the US District Court for the District of Northern Alabama. It is interesting to 
note that iRobot filed a separate lawsuit against the same defendant before a court in Massachusetts for violation of trade secrets. The 
Massachusetts Court ruled that the defendant had misappropriated iRobot’s proprietary and confidential information, violated fair trade 
practices and destroyed evidence: see iRobot’s press release at http://investor.irobot.com/news-releases/news-release-details/irobot-prevails-
lawsuits-against-robotic-fx. Another relevant legal action was started in 2013 by Mako Surgical against Blue Belt Technologies and Mako’s 
former sales manager who had joined the defendant for a position working on the Navio surgical system. The defendants had been sued for 
alleged trade secret misappropriation and for the former employee’s violation of the non-compete obligation to his former employer (Mako 
Surgical). Mako obtained an order preventing that employee (former Mako’s sales manager) from working for BBT for a certain period, in 
any position, and Blue Belt Technologies from using confidential information: see the article “MAKO Surgical Sues Blue Belt 
Technologies”, in Robotic Business Review of 10 June 2014 at 
www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/legal/mako_surgical_sues_blue_belt_technologies. 
41 See Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, repealed by Directive 2009/24/EC. 
42 See also C. Leroux et al, EU Robotics Coordination Action: A green paper on legal issues in robotics (2012), p. 29, available at 
https://www.unipv-lawtech.eu/files/euRobotics-legal-issues-in-robotics-DRAFT_6j6ryjyp.pdf.  
43 Alleged copyright infringement has also been the focus of the above mentioned dispute iRobot v Urus Industrial Corporation (which was 
eventually settled). That case was not just about alleged infringement of the patents covering certain functional aspects of the Roomba. 
iRobot also claimed that Urus’ vacuum cleaner robot infringed copyright in iRobot’s product literature and system interface, including its 
musical audio feedback features. 
44 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.34. 
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the person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to know, that he or she 
is pursuing that objective.” 45 It is a type of protection that may be useful against users or competitors 
that want to access commercially valuable software code. 
  
4. Trademarks 
What about trademarks? How can this IP right add value to robotics companies and their products? In 
general, registering trademarks is crucial to protect products’ goodwill and reputation, especially in 
business-to-consumer industries. Notably, robotics is increasingly becoming an industry where 
products are sold directly to millions of end-users (consumers). The commercial success of products 
such as nanny-robots, pet-robots, caretaker-robots and medical-robots also depends on a reliable brand 
which consumers know, trust, appreciate and remember.46 For this reason, robotics companies with a 
strong brand name and solid reputation are indeed investing on and registering trademarks, especially 
with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), which grants registrations valid and 
effective in all EU Member States. Brands such as “iRobot”,47 “ABB”48 and “Kawasaki”49 as well as 
“Roomba” (the vacuum cleaner from iRobot)50 have all been registered with the EUIPO. Given the 
growing propensity of companies in this sector to register trademarks and build overarching brand 
identities, and the increasing availability of robots amongst consumers, disputes about robotics 
trademark infringements may soon reach courts, in Europe and elsewhere.  
 
5. Designs 
Today robots are becoming consumer facing. A robot’s physical appearance and its “look and feel” 
plays a role in influencing consumer choice.51 Robot designs that meet certain requirements, including 
novelty and individual character, can be registered with the EUIPO, such registrations protecting the 
ornamental features of the machines. Under EU law, for example, it is possible to obtain an EU design 
registration which is valid in all Member States (up to 25 years), with a shorter protection of three 
years also offered to unregistered designs.52 The exclusive rights given by the registrations can then be 
enforced against third parties that use designs that are perceived by an informed user as giving the 
same overall impression. 
                                                
45 Article 6 of Directive 2001/29. A similar provision is set forth by the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA): a rule which was 
invoked in 2001 by Sony when a programmer created and distributed via a website free software to enhance the capabilities of the robot dog 
named Aibo produced by said Japanese company (such user basically decrypted the code defining the robotic dog’s abilities). Sony 
complained that the website in question provided the means to circumvent the copy protection protocol of Sony’s AIBO memory stick to 
allow access to the relevant software, and therefore constituted a violation of the DMCA anti-circumvention provision. On this case see 
Matthew Rimmer, Respect the Code or the Dog Gets It (December 2001) InCite, p. 31, available at 
https://eprints.qut.edu.au/98504/1/aibo.pdf   
46 Luke McDonagh. ‘From Brand Performance to Consumer Performativity: Exploring Trade Mark Law in the Aftermath of Anthropological 
Marketing’, Journal of Law & Society (2015). 
47 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/W01353068. 
48 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/002628964. 
49 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/000814681. 
50 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/002995108. 
51 See Meenakshy Chakravorty, Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Linda J. Thayer, and Robert D. Wells, Design-Patent Protection for Modern Robotics 
Companies: What to Do When the Face of Your Robot Becomes the “Face” of Your Company, published in Robotics Business Review, July 
1, 2014, at p.6. 
52 EU Regulation 6/2002. 
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Some robotics companies in Europe have taken advantage of this chance and obtained EU design 
registrations protecting the ornamental features of products such as vacuum cleaners,53  robotic 
lawnmowers54 and transportation robots.55 Also, design rights may soon be regularly sought by 
companies active in the field of wearable robots, ie devices that are used to enhance people’s motion 
and physical abilities. Despite having functional elements, these products may be devised in a way 
which makes them more appealing to final consumers – and design rights could be the appropriate 
legal tool in the hands of such firms to protect the eye-catching elements of their products. In other 
words, these rights may help these companies to keep pace with the likely “fashionalisation” of the 
robotics industry. 
 
6. Cooperative approaches in the pre-commercial stages 
While IP protection and enforcement strategies can help robotics companies to reach commercial 
success, one should not neglect the importance of open-source platforms for this industry. Through 
such platforms robotics firms and university researchers allow and even invite third parties (especially 
competitors) to use and improve on existing content, without enforcing IP rights.56 As mentioned 
above, a characteristic of the robotic innovation ecosystem is collaboration between different actors, 
and open-source approaches can arguably facilitate such collaboration and allow flexible 
experimentation. These open platform approaches are used to develop not just software for robotics 
research and product development, but also blueprints including drawings and designs.57 
An example of open source project is the Robot Operating System (ROS), whose code is the 
result of the combined efforts of an international community of programmers. It is basically a 
collection of frameworks for writing robot software consisting of various tools aimed at simplifying 
the task of creating more complex and robust robots for a variety of uses. As explained by the ROS 
website: “From the robot’s perspective, problems that seem trivial to humans often vary wildly 
between instances of tasks and environments.58 Dealing with these variations is so hard that no single 
individual, laboratory, or institution can hope to do it on their own.”59 Those are the reasons why ROS 
was designed, namely to help groups to collaborate and build upon each other’s work.60 
Other examples of non-IP cooperative approaches include iCub, an open source cognitive 
humanoid robotic platform developed at Istituto Italiano di Tecnologia61 as well as Poppy, a platform 
for the creation, use and sharing of interactive 3D printed robots, designed by the public research body 
Inria in Bordeaux. The Poppy Community in particular promotes the sharing of hardware as well as 
software, and features beginners, experts and scientists.62  
As explained by Keisner, Raffo and Wunsch-Vincent, who mentioned in their paper the above 
                                                
53 See https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/designs/004680866-0025; https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/designs/004680866-0026. 
54 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/designs/002524462-0002. 
55 See the webpage https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/designs/005418506-0001. 
56 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.31. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See the webpages at http://www.ros.org/about-ros/. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See the webpage http://www.icub.org. 
62 See the webpage at https://www.poppy-project.org/en/. 
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examples, collaborative open source approaches tend to take place at a pre-commercialisation stage, 
where the type of research which is conducted is basic and does not aim to differentiate the final 
products. As they put it: “[a]ctors ... apply cooperative open-source approaches to obtain common 
robotics platforms, as this allows them to share the substantial up-front investment, avoid duplication 
of effort and perfect existing approaches.”63  But when robotics companies pass from the pre-
commercialisation stage to a phase where investments in their own R&D are necessary, especially to 
differentiate their end-products from those of competitors, proprietary IP is taken into account by these 
firms and monopolistic rights start to be secured.64  
 
III. WORKS AND INVENTIONS CREATED BY MACHINES 
In the previous sections we have looked at how robots and their components can be protected by 
various IP rights, and how cooperative non-IP focused approaches may better serve the interests of the 
robotics industry in pre-commercial phases of development. We now turn our attention to the 
fascinating issue of whether robots can generate unpredictable output that can be protected by IP. 
Indeed, as the software-hardware integration becomes increasingly central for the robotic industry, 
robots with an express ability to create and invent in their own right could be soon become widespread 
and of common use. After all, there are already robots embedded with AI which can be seen as 
exhibiting such abilities. 
   Should these outputs be protected by copyright and patent laws? Should they be left to the 
public domain? If they are protectable, who should be deemed the owner of the resulting copyright or 
patent? The programmer? Or the user? We now delve into these legal issues, that have already caught 
the attention of several scholars and commentators who have focused on intangible AI, i.e. software-
guided machines that are capable of creating and inventing and do not rely on any physical 
components.65 In this article, we will also take into account creative output produced by AI-embedded 
robots equipped with physical and tangible elements, which give them enhanced abilities to create.66 A 
striking example is Paul, a robot that uses its camera eye and arm to draw portraits of human 
subjects.67 The above identified IP issues however remain pretty much the same, whether we talk 
about intangible AI-empowered software or we consider AI-equipped robots that can also rely on 
physical embodiment to enhance creativity. In tackling the legal issues reference will be made to 
various jurisdictions, especially the EU and some of its Member States.  
                                                
63 Keisner, Raffo, Wunsch-Vincent, above note 2, at p.31. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See, amongst others, Ana Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World? A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of Creations by 
Artificial Intelligence Systems (2017) Journal of Internet Law Andres Guadamuz, Do androids dream of electric copyright? Comparative 
analysis of originality in artificial intelligence generated works, 2 Intell. Prop. Q. 169, (2017); Ryan Abbott, ‘Artificial intelligence, big data 
and intellectual property: protecting computer-generated works in the United Kingdom’, in Tanya Aplin (ed), Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies (2017 Elgar); Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated 
Works 69 Rutgers L. Rev. 251 (2016); Jani McCutcheon, The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A Critical Analysis of 
Recent Australian Case Law (2013) Melbourne University Law Review, 36; Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the 
Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 5 (2012); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the 
Future of Patent Law (2016) 57 Boston College Law Review; Ben Hattenbach – Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and 
Artificial Intelligence (2015) 19 Stanford Technology Law Review 32. 
66  For the sake of clarity, we will use in the remainder of the article the terms “machine”, “robot” and “computer” interchangeably. 
67  See the BBC webpage http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1f4Z6k7Clz6qY6Q2K56nkzZ/robotticelli-the-mechanical-marvel-
creating-extraordinary-works-of-art. 
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1. Machines, creative works and copyright 
Music, literature and art are already being produced by computers and machines today. Examples 
abound: from Jukedeck (a startup that uses AI to produce music)68 to the Cybernetic Poet (a software 
which allows a computer to write poetry)69 and The Next Rembrandt (a 3D printed painting made 
solely from data of Rembrandt’s body of work),70 amongst many others. That most works created by 
robots are capable of falling within the subject matter of copyright is not in doubt. Simply listening to 
the music, reading the poems, or looking at the art in question confirms it.71 This is also recognised by 
copyright statutes such as the UK Copyright Designs Patent Act (CDPA) that includes computer 
generated works amongst the subject matter of copyright.72 
To help understand the copyright debate around these categories of works, a distinction should 
be made between computer-aided and computer-generated works, with the former category 
representing works that are produced by humans with the mere help of machines and the latter 
referring to output autonomously created by AI. Abbott explores this distinction by reference to a 
spectrum: “On the one end, computers may function as simple tools that assist human authors …, 
much the way that a pen … can help someone to write.”73 He continues by noting that “[a]t the other 
end of the spectrum, computers generate works under circumstances in which no human author … can 
be identified.”74 In other words, the level of machine autonomy in producing the work is inversely 
proportional to the presence of human input in the creative process: more machine autonomy means 
less human input.  
This debate is not entirely new, and judges in the past have looked at situations where the 
creation of works occurred with the help of machines. The 1980 English case Express Newspapers plc 
v Liverpool Daily Post is quite interesting.75 This dispute arose out of the competition between 
newspapers in their lottery contest. The lottery at issue was the ‘Millionaire of the month’ competition 
managed by the Daily Express. It consisted of sequences of letters set out in a grid of five rows and 
five columns. The defence by the Liverpool Daily Post focused on the argument that no copyright 
subsisted in the letters as they had been produced by a computer, with no human author involved. Mr 
Justice Whitford was not convinced and clarified that “the computer was no more than a tool with 
which the sequences and grids were produced using the instruction of the programmer”.76 He then 
compared such scenario to a person using a pen: “[i]t is ... unrealistic ... to suggest that, if you write 
your work with a pen, it is the pen which is the author of the work rather than the person who drives 
the pen”. The judge concluded that “output from a computer that has been randomly generated by the 
                                                
68 See the webpage https://www.jukedeck.com. 
69 See the webpage http://www.kurzweilcyberart.com/poetry/rkcp_poetry_samples.php. 
70 See the webpage https://www.nextrembrandt.com. 
71 Artworks produced by AI have also started being auctioned: see for example a sale by Christie of an AI-created portrait in a gilt frame in 
October 2018 (see Christie webpage at https://www.christies.com/features/A-collaboration-between-two-artists-one-human-one-a-machine-
9332-1.aspx). 
72 Section 178 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
73 Abbott (2017), above note 65, p.2. 
74 Abbott (2017), above note 65, p.3. 
75 Express Newspapers Plc. v Liverpool Daily Post & Echo Plc. and Others [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1089. 
76 Ibid. 
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machine itself is a copyright work”. 
Express Newspapers plc v Liverpool Daily Post is a case from the 1980s, and it goes without 
saying that technology has advanced significantly since then. Recent developments have led to 
machines that can independently learn and create, with the human input in the creative process 
becoming more and more redundant.77 Take the Painting Fool, a striking example of a creative 
machine, and an “aspiring painter”:78 it is a computer program which can simulate the physical 
painting process and detect emotions of people as well as use its abilities to paint portraits and invent 
visual scenes by means of generative techniques.79 Another example is the above mentioned Paul, 
described as a robotic installation which uses its camera eye to create portraits of people.80 As opposed 
to the Painting Fool, which is a computer program, Paul consists of a physical robotic arm. As 
explained by its creators Tresset and Leymarie, “[t]he drawings we are aiming to produce with an 
embodied system such as Paul are distinct from those made by a human hand, and yet it is our 
experience that they have comparable emotional and aesthetic artistic effects on the observer.”81 
Reactions by critics have been positive, with collectors and artists accepting Paul’s productions as 
artworks of good quality (a drawing by Paul is part of the Victoria and Albert museum collection). 
Evidently, the era where judges and scholars debated about whether the author of the work is 
the pen “rather than the person who drives the pen” looks prehistoric now – and one may presume that 
creative machines will become even more widespread in the future.82 Obviously, these developments 
suggest that works created by AI-embedded robots may be considered as within the subject matter of 
copyright. With that said, we now assess whether machine-created outputs are capable of meeting the 
requirements for protection.83 
 
a. Originality and authorship 
Copyright protects works that satisfy the originality requirement. The EU originality criterion as 
affirmed in Infopaq requires the work to be the author’s own intellectual creation: “... works such as 
computer programs, databases or photographs are protected by copyright only if they are original in 
the sense that they are their author’s own intellectual creation.”84 Following Infopaq, this is considered 
a generalised standard of originality applying not only to computer programs, photographs or 
databases,85 but to all literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. In Eva-Maria Painer (focusing on 
copyright protection of portray photographs), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
                                                
77 Madeleine de Cock Buning, ‘Autonomous Intelligent Systems as Creative Agents under the EU framework for Intellectual Property’ 
(2016) European Journal of Risk Regulation, p. 311. 
78 See the webpage at http://www.thepaintingfool.com. Simon Colton, a Professor of Computational Creativity in the Department of 
Computing of Goldsmiths College, University of London, is the academic behind the Painting Fool.  
79 See the webpage at www.thepaintingfool.com/about/index.html. 
80 Patrick Tresset and Frederic Fol Leymarie, Portrait drawing by Paul the robot, Computers & Graphics 37 (2013) 348–363 at p.348. 
81 Idem. 
82 See also Bridy, above note 65, p. 4 (discussing on the generative art movement, which aims at exploring ‘computational creativity’ via “a 
set of creative practices whereby the artist cedes control to a system that is self-contained enough to operate autonomously”).  
83 The fixation requirement, provided by several copyright acts (for example, in the US and UK), will not be analysed here. There is indeed 
little doubt that most of machine-produced works meet this requirement. 
84 Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening at [35]. 
85 See respectively Article 1(3) of the Software Directive (Directive 2009/24), Article 6 of the Copyright Term Directive (Directive 93/98) 
and Article 3(1) of the Database Directive (Directive 96/9). 
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clarified that an intellectual creation is an author’s own if it reflects her personality.86 This would be 
the case, the court added, if the author were able to express her abilities in the production of the work 
by making free and creative choices.87 These choices would therefore enable the author to stamp the 
work with her ‘personal touch’.88 
The emphasis on the author’s “own intellectual creation” and “personal touch” suggests that 
the originality requirement involves some degree of human authorship.89 This is reinforced by what 
Advocate General Trstenjak noted in Eva-Maria Painer: “… only human creations are … protected, 
which can also include those for which the person employs a technical aid, such as a camera” 
(emphasis added).90 This comment calls to mind the distinction between computer-aided works and 
computer-generated works. It also seems to suggest that only computer-aided works can be protected 
by copyright, where computer-generated works cannot qualify as ‘human creations’ due to lack of 
human input. One may reasonably doubt about whether a machine can stamp its output with its 
personal touch by making free and creative choices, and in general whether it can have a personality at 
all, let alone legal personality, and all the rights that status would bring. 
Yet, an examination of how some machines actually work may lead to another conclusion. 
Think again about Painting Fool as an example: during a festival on computational creativity in 2013, 
the machine was used to create ‘mood-driven’ portraits of the guests. The software’s mood was 
determined by its analysis of newspaper articles from The Guardian. The average sentiment was then 
used to simulate the Painting Fool, being it a positive, very positive, experimental, reflective, negative 
or very negative mood.91 As explained by Colton and Ventura: “[i]f in a positive/very positive mood, 
the software [the Painting Fool] chooses one/two of nine upbeat adjectives (e.g. bright, colorful, 
happy) and directs the sitter to smile while it extracts their image from a video recording. ... If in a 
negative mood, the software chooses one of six downbeat adjectives (e.g. bleary, bloody, chilling) and 
directs the sitter to express a sad face. If in an experimental mood, it chooses one of 11 neutral 
adjectives (e.g. glazed, abstract, calm) and asks the sitter to pull an unusual face ...”.92 The chosen 
adjective is used to select a filter to achieve an appropriate visualisation. The program also selected 
one of seven rendering styles involving the simulation of paints, pencils and pastels to produce the 
portrait. 
That said, could one argue that the behaviour of the Painting Fool displays an ability to make 
creative and independent choices which renders its works original? After all, in Eva-Maria Painer the 
CJEU suggested that an author could stamp a portrait photograph with her personal touch by making 
choices such as the applicable background, lightning, angel and atmosphere of the portrait.93 Similarly, 
                                                
86 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH and Others at [88]. 
87 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others at [89]. See also Case C-604/10 Football Dataco at [39] (citing 
also, by analogy, Case C-393/09 Bezpecnostni Softwarova Asociace at [48] and [49], and Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football 
Association Premier League and Others at [98]).  
88 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others at [92]. 
89 Madeleine de Cock Buning, above note 77, p.314.  
90 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Opinion of Advocate General Trsteniak, 12 April 2011, at [121].  
91 See webpage at http://www.thepaintingfool.com/galleries/you_cant_know_my_mind/ICCC_YCKMM.pdf. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others at [91]-[92]. 
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in light of the software’s freedom to make creative choices by reference to its mood, it could be said 
that the Painting Fool could be considered as imbuing the portraits with its personal touch. 
Yet, one may counter-argue that machines such as the Painting Fool or robots like Paul lack a 
fundamental ingredient of any copyright work, namely a human being. This point brings into the 
picture another requirement for copyright protection, ie authorship, which entails that no creation that 
does not entail at least some degree of human intervention is eligible for copyright protection.94 The 
concept of authorship is intertwined with the originality requirement.95 Indeed, the latter’s focus on the 
‘author’s own intellectual creation’ seems to imply a human author behind the work. Several copyright 
laws limit authorship to natural persons. Spanish law for example provides that the author is the 
natural person creating the work;96 French law states that only a natural person can be the author.97 
Likewise, the US Copyright Office emphasises the importance of the human element in the creative 
process, with no claim that does not satisfy the Human Authorship Requirement being registered. In 
other words, the US Office only registers an original work of authorship “…provided that the work 
was created by a human being.”98 
  The authorship requirement will not raise significant issues when the machine merely aids a 
natural person in the creative process (and indeed in Express Newspapers plc v Liverpool Daily Post 
Mr Justice Whtiford found no authorship issue). This is also the point made by Advocate General 
Trstenjak in Eva-Maria Painer; ie that copyright protection is available for human creations, including 
those for which the person employs a technical aid, such as a camera.99 Another example is that of a 
person using the aid of editing software to produce a picture.100 Here, the end product will reflect the 
creative impulses of the artist and thereby her personality.101 
Authorship issues may instead arise where the machine input materially outweighs that of the 
human which uses it, ie where the level of human intervention in the creative process is minimal and 
when that of the robot is predominant. This is when the line has been crossed from a situation where 
the machine has merely aided the human to create towards a scenario where the work has been 
generated by the robot itself. Verifying when such line is crossed may not be easy, and a thorough 
case by case analysis may often be required to determine the level of human input in the whole 
creative process. In other words, deciding whether a work qualifies for copyright protection under EU 
                                                
94 Most copyright acts, including in the US and UK, however, still do not provide a definition of “authors”. Just judicial decisions address 
what authorship means, and who an author is (see Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul 
L. Rev. 1063, 1066 (2002)). In the US for example the Supreme Court has defined an author as ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature’ (Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). 
US lower courts have also noted that an author must be more than one who contributes creativity or originality to a work (Aalmuhammed v. 
Lee, 202 F. 3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000)); basically, it must be one ‘who superintended the whole work, the “master mind”’’ (Ibid. (citing 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 53, 61)). 
95 See also Ramalho, above note 65, p.10. 
96 See Preambulo, Ley 22/11 sobre la Propiedad Intelectual de 1987: “los derechos que corresponden al autor, que es quien realiza la tarea 
puramente humana y personal de creacion de la obra y que, por lo mismo, constituyen el nucleo esencial del objeto de la presente Ley”. 
97 The French Code of intellectual property defines protectable subject matter as ‘oeuvres de l’esprit’: see Article L112-1 of the French Code 
de la Propriete’ Intellectuelle. 
98 U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 101 (3d ed. 2017),  306. Examples of works that fail the 
authorship requirement include, for instance, a photograph taken by a monkey and works “... produced by a machine ... that operates 
randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author” (see Compendium 313.2). 
99 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH, Opinion of Advocate General Trsteniak, 12 April 2011, at 121. 
100 Guadamuz, above note 65, p.178. 
101 Guadamuz, above note 65, p.178. 
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copyright law (as well as under US law, which as mentioned does require authorship)102 requires an 
assessment of the level of human as opposed to machine input.103 The aim of this analysis is to 
determine whether the work can be said to reflect predominantly the (human) author’s own intellectual 
creation, and thus attract copyright. If such human element lacks, copyright may not subsist. 
 
b. The UK solution 
An approach that aims at finding a pragmatic solution has been adopted by the UK. Section 9(3) of the 
CDPA provides that “[i]n the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-
generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the 
creation of the work are undertaken.” A few other common law jurisdictions have followed this 
approach.104 The CPDA also defines a computer-generated work as one generated by a computer in 
circumstances where there is no human author.105 What these provisions do is basically to broaden the 
concept of author in a way which is sufficient enough to subsume human beings that simply instigate 
and trigger the creation of the work. In other words, the author (and owner of the relevant economic 
rights) will be considered a person (either natural or legal) who may have played no role at all in the 
actual production of the work. The law here basically introduces a legal fiction as it considers author a 
person who has not directly produced the word, but has merely made the necessary arrangements for 
such production.106 
This solution clearly departs from the anthropocentric and human focus of copyright laws in 
jurisdictions such as the EU and US (Guadamuz also notes that these provisions that recognise 
copyright in computer generated works with no human input constitute an exception to the originality 
requirement, as the works in question do not directly originate from an author).107 Indeed, such 
solution does not look at whether a human being has actually produced the work. It just considers the 
objective creation of the output, and then “finds” who the author (and thus the copyright owner) 
should be, i.e. the person who has come up with the necessary arrangements, which could also be a 
company. Yet, it is not quite a revolutionary approach, as copyright laws in several jurisdictions 
including UK sometimes attributes ownership to persons who have not directly created the work. This 
is the case with regard to employees’ works with the employer being the copyright owner. 
The UK regime is certainly helpful and may be used to identify authorship, and accordingly 
ownership, in many scenarios where original works are produced by computers or robots with no or 
                                                
102 That authorship is a requirement under US copyright law is confirmed by a string of cases that have dealt with who should be considered 
author in situations where “celestial voices” may have played a role (psychography cases): Oliver v Saint Germain Foundation, 41 F. Supp. 
296 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Urantia Foundation v Burton, No K 75-255 CA 4, 1980; Urantia Foundation v Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Ariz. 
1995); Penguin Books, Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavour, No 96 CIV. 4126. Indeed, when faced with claims of supernational 
authorship, US courts in those disputes concluded that only humans can own the copyright. Similarities can also be drawn with claims of 
“animal authorship”, where US courts have confirmed this line of argument: see Naruto v. Slater, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 10129 (9th Cir. 
Cal., Apr. 23, 2018) (rejecting the argument brought by the plaintiff, an animal rights organisation, that US copyright law does not prohibit 
an animal – in the case at issue, a monkey that have taken a selfie - from owning a copyright. The court held that while the animal had 
constitutional standing it “lacked statutory standing to claim copyright infringement of photographs).” 
103 Guadamuz, above note 65, p.179. 
104 Namely, Ireland, New Zealand, India, South Africa and Hong Kong. 
105 See again Sec. 178 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
106 McCutcheon, above note 65, at pp. 44-45. 
107 Guadamuz, above note 65, p.176.  
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little human input.108 Yet, it might not be always easy to identify who the person who has made the 
necessary “arrangements” is, namely who puts the machine in the condition to create the work. Is this 
person the machine’s programmer? Or the user? Section 9(3) of the CDPA 1988 may not help much 
here. It could be argued that determining who is that person entails a careful analysis of the facts, 
circumstances and specific robotics application that generated the work. A case by case analysis again 
is therefore necessary. For example, in Nova Productions v Mazooma Games,109 the only UK case 
where s. 9(3) CDPA has been applied so far, the court had to determine whether copyrights had been 
infringed in the graphics and frames generated and displayed by the users on a screen when playing a 
videogame. It was held that such frames were computer generated works, and that the programmer 
was the person making the arrangements and therefore the author and owner of the copyright. As the 
Court of Appeal put it, “the player is not ... an author of any of the artistic works created in the 
successive frame images. His input is not artistic in nature ... and he has contributed no skill or labour 
of an artisitc kind ... All he has done is to play the game“.110 
With that said, what about other more robot-focused examples? Let’s take again Paul, the 
robotic arm that produces observational face drawings of people, by using an eye camera to focus on 
and take snapshots of the person to be drawn and then executing the drawing with a pen hold by the 
arm. Whoever uses Paul does not really have the power to change the settings, for example to direct or 
change the process that leads to the artistic output. It could thus be argued that Paul’s creator (and not 
the person who actually uses it) should be considered the person that makes the necessary 
arrangements. The same is true of the Painting Fool, a computer program that simulates the physical 
painting process without giving users much control on how to drive such process. 
On the other hand, whenever users of the machines or robots have actually the chance to 
manage or influence the whole or part of the process (in other words, where they do not have to just 
press a button), they may be considered the authors and owners of the resulting work. Two scenarios 
may here be distinguished. First, we could have a situation where the user merely manages the 
creative process by running the program and generating the output. An example might be Deep 
Dream, a popular computer vision program that employs a convolutional neural network to find and 
enhance patterns in images through algorithms. It has been argued that, as the creator of the program 
(Google) has released the code as open source and any user can run the program and actually generate 
art (for example, by choosing predetermined styles), it would be the users the ones that make the 
necessary arrangements and thus should be considered authors under Section 9(3) CDPA.111 Second, 
we could also have a scenario where users’ input is more creative than managerial, for instance when 
it’s the user that makes the most important creative choices with the machine or robot merely 
                                                
108 For an opposite opinion see Lionel Bently, mentioned by Begoña González Otero and Joao Pedro Quintais Before the Singularity: 
Copyright and the Challenges of Artificial Intelligence (2018) Kluwer Copyright Blog, available at 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/09/25/singularity-copyright-challenges-artificial-intelligence/ (stressing that the CDPA 
provisions on computer-generated works do not offer a useful model for protecting AI outputs, because of their incompatibility with the EU 
copyright acquis and failure to address the issue of originality). 
109 Nova Productions v Mazooma Games [2007] EWCA Civ. 219.  
110 Ibid., at [106].  
111 Guadamuz, above note 65, p.177.   
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executing such decisions.112 In this case we would probably move towards the other side of the 
spectrum identified by Abbott, where computers function as simple tools that assist human authors. 
Such works would therefore be more comparable to machine-aided works, with no need to trigger the 
“authorial” legal fiction engineered by Section 9(3) CDPA.113 
 
c. Copyright or Public Domain?   
We have considered whether copyright can subsist in machine generated works, and who would be 
considered author and owner of the economic rights that result under the law. But what also ought to 
be discussed is whether copyright should apply to these outputs at all, as a matter of policy. Some 
scholars have proposed leaving such works – works generated autonomously by machines - in the 
public domain, with the result that everyone would be able to use them, even for commercial 
purposes.114 As has been noted, outputs produced by robots would be comparable to things found in 
nature, like music that the wind generates when it moves through wind chimes or the sounds of a 
waterfall, or birds singing at dawn.115 
But is this outcome desirable? Would the refusal to offer copyright to machine-generated 
works discourage investments in, and dissemination of, these “creative” technologies?116 It could 
indeed be argued that without the lure of monopolistic rights offered by copyright not many persons 
and/or their employers would bother to develop machines or robots capable of creating musical, 
literary or artistic outputs. As this is already a field where investments are necessary (let’s think of 
companies that offer music production software), the need to secure copyright may become apparent 
with the industry, especially to avoid the inevitable market failure that would be caused by an absence 
of exclusive rights over the created content.117  
Proposals have been put forward by Ana Ramalho that take into account the above concerns.118 
The first is the introduction of a sui generis right of a limited period of time protecting output created 
by AI embedded machines and robots, similar to the EU database right which aims at protecting 
investments.119 This right would incentivise and reward the investments made in the development of 
those machines and robots. The second proposal, more concerned with enhancing the accessibility of 
                                                
112 This scenario may soon become a common reality, for example in the field of computer games, taking into consideration the increasingly 
relevant roles of users in such interactive games: see Ramalho, above note 65, p.11. 
113 See also Denicola, pp.283-285 (noting that, should users be considered the authors of computer-generated works, there would not be need 
anymore to distinguish between machine-generated works and machine-aided works. Indeed, if the creative output is considered to be 
authored by someone other than the user of the machine (or is not deemed copyrigthable at all), it would be necessary to differentiate 
situations where the computer is simply a tool from scenarios where the machine itself is the creator. Denicola thus believes that the “users’ 
option” should be preferred. The market – he stresses - already supplies programmers with the incentive to create software and machines 
which are used to create works, such incentive mainly coming from the prospect of maximising sales. Also, should programmers be deemed 
as authors and owners of the copyright over the work produced by the machine – his argument goes - users may not be encouraged to 
purchase and use the software to create works as they would not be the copyright holders: which would eventually jeopardise the interests of 
programmers that may see sales of their machines decrease. Finally, attributing programmers copyright may often turn out to be useless as 
programmers themselves would frequently be anaware of the creation of works by users. 
114 Amir H. Khouri, Intellectual Property Rights for Hubots: on the Legal Implications of Human-like Robots as Innovators and Creators 
(2017) Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Volume 35, Issue 3. 
115 Khouri, above note 114, p. 668. 
116 See also McCutcheon, above note 65, p.952 (noting that “while the incentive of copyright may be irrelevant to a novelist compelled to 
write their opus, it may well explain why an expensive computer-generated production is made. Without that reward, the work may not be 
made ... or disseminated“).  
117 See Tatiana Synodinou, mentioned by González Otero and Quintais, above note 108. 
118 Ramalho, above note 65, p.16-20. 
119 Database Directive (Directive 96/9). 
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the content produced by AI, is to create a sort of “disseminator’s right” comparable to the publisher’s 
right in the publication of previously unpublished works provided by the EU Term of Protection 
Directive.120 While this right would be inherently economic, which would allow the right holder to 
extract value out of the creations, it would also intend to stimulate the dissemination of output that is 
increasingly perceived as being meritorious.  
 
2. Inventions developed by machines, and patents 
This section explores the issue of patentability of robot-generated inventions. Again, the focus here is 
not on machines which merely aid humans during the inventive process, but rather on robots that 
generate inventions without human input. The burning question is whether such inventions can be 
protected under patent law. No patent statute, and related case law authority, specifically addresses 
computational subject matter and no patent office has adopted detailed policies on these issues. This is 
not a purely academic exercise - and the debate on whether machine-generated inventions should be 
considered patentable is much needed also in light of the fact that patent protection in this field may 
further encourage the development of creative computers and systems, which may be deemed a 
socially desirable target. 
It has been noted that computers have already come up with inventions. For example, 
Hattenbach and Glucoft reported that a company named Cloem use brute-force computing to 
mechanically compose text for thousands of claims covering potential new inventions.121  More 
precisely, automated software here employ automated drafting techniques which can create tens of 
thousands of alternative patent claims.122 Also, Abbott mentions the so-called Creativity Machine, a 
patented123 computational machine created by US computer scientist Stephen Thaler that is capable of 
generating novel (patentable) ideas via software concept referred to as artificial neural networks.124 
One of such ideas – called “Neural Network Based Prototyping System and Method” - was actually 
patented,125 but who was designated as inventor in the application was not the Creativity Machine 
itself, but its creator Stephen Thaler who listed himself as the actual inventor. Abbott uses this 
example to make the point that patent offices (in this case, the US patent office) have already granted 
patents for inventions developed by non-human inventors, probably without being aware of such non 
human element; and to stress that this has probably occurred because the applicants did not want to 
risk losing the opportunity to get the patent, as there is a lack of legal clarity about whether machine-
generated inventions can qualify for patent protection.126 Thus, omitting to disclose the role of the 
machine in the inventive process can be seen as an appealing option to avoid the patent being 
                                                
120 Article 4 of Copyright Term Directive (Directive 93/98) provides that “Any person who, after the expiry of copyright protection, for the 
first time lawfully publishes or lawfully communicates to the public a previously unpublished work, shall benefit from a protection 
equivalent to the economic rights of the author. The term of protection of such rights shall be 25 years from the time when the work was first 
lawfully published or lawfully communicated to the public”. 
121 Hattenbach – Glucoft, above note 65, p. 35 (reporting that said brute-force computing has also been used to create defensive publications 
aimed at preventing others from patenting in the same field). 
122 Hattenbach – Glucoft, above note 65, pp. 36 and 51 et seqq. (noting however that many of these claims appear non-sensical, and that 
therefore their validity needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis).  
123 See US patent No 5,659,666. 
124 Abbott (2016), above note 65, pp.1083-1086. 
125 See US patent No 5,852,815. 
126 Abbott (2016), above note 65, p.1081. 
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challenged on the grounds of lack of human inventorship. 
As noted, there is not much clarity with regards to whether inventors need to be human 
beings. For example, what does the EPC provide? It does state that applications need to mention the 
designation of the inventor,127 which must include among other information the inventor’s family 
name, given names and full address.128 This would suggest that the inventor is to be a natural person. 
Likewise, the UK Patents Act 1977 refers to natural persons many times.129 Section 7(1), for instance, 
confirms that any person may make an application for a patent, with section 13(2) requiring an 
applicant to identify the person who is believed to be the inventor. It should also be reminded that in 
March 2013 the EU IPR Helpdesk published a Fact Sheet relating to inventorship, authorship and 
ownership, which interestingly noted: “…the inventor is always a natural person and the first owner” 
(emphasis added).130 While these provisions and statement do not expressly point out that machine and 
robot-generated inventions cannot obtain patent protection, they epitomise the importance of 
considering inventors as human beings.  
Yet, one may also argue that no human inventorship requirement exists, at least in Europe, by 
pointing to the Guidelines for the examination of European Patents. Part A, Chapter III, Section 5(2) 
of such Guidelines refer to the possibility for inventors to waive the right to be mentioned as inventor: 
“The inventor designated by the applicant may address to the EPO a written waiver of his right to be 
mentioned as inventor in the published European patent application and the European patent 
specification, in which case his name is not mentioned”.131 This echoes what the EPO Guidelines for 
international applicants that choose the so-called PCT route132 suggest in relation to the designation of 
the inventor: “It is recommended that the inventor always be identified … unless there are special 
reasons for not doing so” (emphasis added).133 These guidelines confirm that patent applications can 
be prosecuted, even until the final issuance of the patent, without designating any human inventor: 
which in turn may seem to indirectly suggest that patentable inventions could also be developed by 
non-human agents (the above emphasised sentence strengthens this argument). 
That said, it remains to be seen whether AI-triggered inventions satisfy the patentability 
requirements, especially the inventive step (or non-obviousness) requirement. Indeed, no invention is 
patented if it is obvious to a person skilled in the art (as provided for example by Article 56 EPC and 
most patent statutes around the world). This requirement aims at raising the bar to getting patents, 
excluding from protection innovation that is within the reach of the average expert of the field. Can 
then a machine or robot-generated invention satisfy this criteria? One may argue that - taking into 
account a machine’s or robot’s potentially high level of intelligence – the inventions reached by such 
                                                
127 EPC Rule 19(1); See also Article 41(2)(j) of the EPC confirming that the request for a grant of a European patent shall contain the 
designation of the inventor, where the applicant is the inventor. 
128 EPC Rule 19(1) 
129 Abbott, (2016) above note 65, p.7 
130  European IPR Helpdesk, ‘Fact Sheet Inventorship, Authorship and Ownership’ March 2013 see 
https://www.iprhelpdesk.eu/sites/default/files/newsdocuments/Fact-Sheet-Inventorship-Authorship-Ownership.pdf, at p.3. 
131 See the EPO webpage at https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/a_iii_5_2.htm. 
132 PCT stands for Patent Cooperation Treaty, an international treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
which assists applicants in obtaining patent protection internationally for their inventions and helps offices, including the EPO, with their 
decisions to grant or refuse the patent. 
133 See the EPO webpage at https://www.epo.org/applying/international/guide-for-applicants/html/e/ga_b_18.html. 
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machine or robot would often meet the threshold in question.134 Take for example the question-
answering computer system Watson, developed by IBM, which is capable of answering questions 
posed in natural language.135 Abbott noted that some Watson’s results have been so surprising to its 
creators that they may be considered non obvious and therefore as meeting this requirement.136 
The attraction of machine and robot developed inventions into the realm of patentable subject 
matter may also change the way the inventive step criteria is assessed by patent examiners and judges. 
Currently, patent officers and courts take into account, as benchmark, the “person skilled in the art”, 
i.e. somebody who is considered as having good knowledge of the relevant prior art, and an 
understanding of whether the invention to be examined departs significantly from that existing body of 
knowledge. Yet, as interestingly noted by Abbott, the acceptance of computational innovation by 
patent laws may trigger a “substitution” of the concept of “skilled (human) person” with the notion of 
“skilled computer”, with the inevitable result that patenting inventions may become more difficult.137 
Indeed, because of the way they have been programmed, machines and computers have an incredible 
extensive knowledge of the prior art, much broader than the knowledge a human being may have, 
even in fields not strictly related to those of the inventions to be analysed: this would likely raise the 
bar to obtaining patents. While stricter patent procedures are certainly to be welcomed (patent offices 
have often been accused of being too generous for granting patents for trivial inventions), a system 
where the benchmark becomes the “skilled machine” would also pose challenges. For example, patent 
examiners and judges would have “to put themselves in the shoes” of the skilled computer and take 
into consideration the prior art which may be within the reach of powerful machines, but not human 
beings:138 which might turn out to be practically (and humanly) undoable. 
Finally, the issue of ownership of patent rights over the inventions developed by machines or 
robots should also be mentioned. This point will likely be crucial if and when applications designating 
computers as inventors start to be accepted. As computers cannot (at least, yet) own legal rights, 
possible “candidates” for holding ownership rights would be: (i) the programmer of the AI software 
which produced the invention; (ii) the user of such program who gives the AI tasks; or (iii) even the 
owner of the machine or robot themselves.139 The issue is undoubtedly difficult to resolve, and once 
more a case-by-case analysis aimed at finding out who has substantially contributed the most to the 
invention will probably be needed to identify the owner of the resulting patent. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The robot revolution is already a reality, and firms and ventures specialising in the area of robotics 
will certainly continue to thrive in the future. In this article we have focused on the intersection 
                                                
134 Yet, it has also been noted that certain mechanically generated claims may be considered obvious. For example, the linguistic 
manipulation software devised by the company Cloem (see above, including note 121) often merely adds or deletes sentences. As noted by 
Hattenbach and Glucoft, above note 65, p. 45, many of these claims are “the result of relatively slight rearrangements, and these minor 
modifications that work in predictable ways would by definition be considered obvious”. 
135 See Watson related webpages at https://www.ibm.com/watson. 
136 Abbott (2016), noted above 65, pp.1091 
137 Abbott (2016), noted above 65, pp.1124-1125. 
138 Abbott (2016), noted above 65, pp.1125. 
139 Abbott (2016), above note 65, p.1114. 
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between robotics and IP, and stressed the importance of patents, trade secrets, copyright, trademarks 
and designs as tools to attract and recoup the big investments that are needed in this field. While there 
are phases within the life of robotics firms where a cooperative and non-IP focused policy is better 
suited to support the growth of the venture, IP strategies based on the exploitation of proprietary rights 
are certainly key in shaping and strengthening this industry. Just filing a patent, design or trademark 
application may not be enough – taking legal action against competitors that try to free-ride on the 
investments made by someone else is also increasingly necessary. We have mentioned some of these 
lawsuits, several of which have been settled with a consent judgement that has left the claimant that 
enforced its IP in a stronger position than the alleged infringer. Yet, some legal actions aimed at 
protecting IP in robotics have also been criticised, particularly where patents have been granted by 
patent offices with broadly drafted claims and aggressively enforced against competitors.140 
Robots, especially those embedded with AI, may also be capable of coming up with works or 
inventions that are usually created by human beings, being them painters, illustrators, poets or 
engineers. Whether these artistic, literary, musical or technical outputs meet the requirements for 
copyright or patent protection, and who the author or the inventor is, are thorny issues that are 
currently giving IP scholars and lawyers food for thought: issues that will become even more burning 
as technology keeps advancing and allows robots and machines to perform behaviours or tasks with a 
higher degree of autonomy. What we may be witnessing in the not so distant future is not only the 
continued progress of robotics technology which will increase AI capabilities, but also an evolution of 
copyright and patent regimes that will put at the centre of the debate the creation of “works” or the 
development of “inventions”, possibly diminishing the roles of “authors” and “inventors”. Are we 
moving from the “laws of authors and inventors” to the “laws of copyright works and patentable 
inventions”? The robotics and AI industry may be the innovative sectors that will provide answers to 
these questions.141 Time will tell. 
                                                
140  See article “The IP Battle Continues for Robotics Companies”, in Robotic Business Review of 7 January 2018, at 
https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/legal/the_ip_battle_continues_for_robotics_companies.  
141 See also Massimo Maggiore, Artificial Intelligence, Computer-Generated Works and Copyright, in Enrico Bonadio – Nicola Lucchi, Non-
Conventional Copyright – Do New and Atypical Works Deserve Protection? (2018 Elgar), p.391. 
